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With an Even Hand: The Call for Pakistan’s
Executive Task Force for Religious Tolerance
Hon. J. Clifford Wallace*
There are times when the right person is in the right position to
cause a dramatic change in the course of the history of a country
and its people’s rights. I believe, and others may also, one of those
times was June 19, 2014. It was on this day that former Chief Justice
Tassaduq Hussain Jillani of Pakistan filed his authored opinion on
behalf of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, blazing a new trail
in his country’s decades’ long struggle dealing with minority
religious rights.
It may seem odd that this has been such a problem in Pakistan.
After all, Pakistan was divided off from India to protect the rights
of the minority Muslims. Now, decades later, few are left of the
courageous minority religion who were willing to divide a country
to gain the freedom to practice peacefully their belief in Islam. As
pointed out in Chief Justice Jillani’s opinion, “The protection of
the freedom of religious belief and practice of all communities was
indeed the predominant right asserted in several propositions and
resolutions passed by the All India Muslim League,” and “the
ide[o]logy underlying the Pakistan Movement was the creation of
a separate nation state for the protection of the interests of the
Muslim minority in India. . . . [T]he very genesis of our country is
grounded in the protection of the religious rights of all, especially
those of minorities.”1
But Pakistan is not alone in the quest to be fair with minorities.
It is an unfortunate frequent occurrence that majorities fail to provide appropriate safeguards for minority rights. It has happened in
the United States of America. Perhaps observing this parallel

* Senior Judge and Chief Judge Emeritus United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
1. (2014) S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 (SC) paras. 2–13 (Pak.) (suo moto actions regarding
suicide bomb attack of 22.9.2013 on the Church in Peshawar and regarding threats being
given to Kalash tribe and Ismailies in Chitral), https://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/
downloads_judgements/smc_1_2014.pdf.
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experience can be of help in the present situation in Pakistan after
Chief Justice Jillani’s important opinion.
I.
The preamble to the 1973 Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Constitution specifically directs that the principle of tolerance, “as
enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.”2
Thus, the courts of Pakistan, in keeping with their duty to
protect and enforce the Constitution, are required to ensure
tolerance is “fully observed.”
Chief Justice Jillani rightly called to our attention in his address
to the Karachi Bar Association in 2014 the words of the Pakistani
founder when Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah first addressed the
Constituent Assembly:
You are free: you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go
to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that
has nothing to do with the business of the State.3

This foundational promise was powerfully reaffirmed by the
Pakistan Supreme Court in its June 19, 2014, opinion, written by
Chief Justice Jillani, reminding citizens that “the very genesis of our
country is grounded in the protection of the religious rights of all,
especially those of minorities,” and declaring that “[i]t is imperative
that the right to freedom of religion be restored as an individual
and indefeasible right.”4
It is interesting to compare the similarities between the
founding of Pakistan and the United States. Further insight can be
drawn from comparing Justice Jillani’s opinion with the United
States’ experience implementing court orders enforcing constitutional rights that challenged existing societal views. Can these
insights assist Pakistan through implementation of the Pakistan
Supreme Court’s June 2014 order reaffirming the constitutional
right to religious liberty for all?
2. PAKISTAN CONST. pmbl.
3. Justice Tassaduq Jillani, Speech at the High Court of Sindh (Feb. 27, 2014) (quoting
President Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
(Aug. 11, 1947), http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_
11aug1947.html).
4. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at paras. 9, 17.
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A.
Over 200 years ago, the United States of America was debating
whether to accept our proposed Constitution. Religious tolerance
became an issue. The result was the adoption of the first Ten
Amendments after the Constitution was approved. The First
Amendment prevented the Congress from adopting any legislation
which would interfere with the free exercise of religion—meaning
all religions: Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or others. Thus, the
United States too has a similar constitutional requirement as to
religious tolerance.
There was an important religious tolerance requirement directed
toward Islam when the Prophet Muhammad signed a document
with a delegation from the St. Catherine Monastery, which included
the following:
Verily I, the servants, the helpers, and my followers defend them,
because Christians are my citizens; and by Allah! I hold out
against anything that displeases them.
No compulsion is to be on them.
Neither are their judges to be removed from their jobs nor their
monks from their monasteries.
No one is to destroy a house of their religion, to damage it, or to
carry anything from it to Muslims’ houses.
Should anyone take any of these [belongings], he would spoil
God’s covenant and disobey His Prophet. Verily, they are my
allies and have my secure charter . . . .5

It is true that Pakistan has chosen through the democratic
process to adopt Islam as a foundation of government. It appears
from the words written in the St. Catherine Monastery document,
however, that tolerance on religious issues is mandatory—that is, a
Christian may freely practice his or her religion without interference
so long as it does not violate the law of the land.
Cases arise in all courts that challenge a religion or a religious
practice. In the United States, we are guided by our First Amendment.
In Pakistan, judges are guided by the preamble to the Constitution.
5. A. Zahoor & Z. Haq, Prophet Muhammad’s Charter of Privileges to Christians: Letter
to the Monks of St. Catherine Monastery, ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION, www.cyberistan.org/
islamic/charter1.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2020).
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Both require the same tolerance of religious belief and practice so
long as it does not violate the duly enacted law of our countries.
This brings me to the recent proceedings at the Supreme Court
of Pakistan where the principle of religious tolerance was
highlighted as a critical human right protected by Pakistan’s
constitution—a right that the judiciary must take a proactive lead
to promote. The opinion addressed a series of complaints in which
religious minorities were abused and their places of worship
attacked.6 Attacks on minority religious groups, and their places of
worship, are protected by Pakistan’s blasphemy law, a provision of
the penal code. 7 In its decision, the Pakistan Supreme Court
held that not only was relief necessary, but that the federal
government must take steps to promote a culture of religious and
social tolerance through law enforcement and education on a
national scale. The court held that the anti-blasphemy laws protect
all religions.
Sometimes cases present difficult issues—such as whether to
accommodate religions which use drugs as a sacrament.8 However,
guidance on how to decide those issues stems not from our personal
beliefs, but from our Constitution. Both the Pakistani and United
States judiciaries are enjoined to be religiously tolerant.
The result is that whether I am in San Diego or Islamabad, I am
allowed to practice my religion. I highlight this point because religion
excites so many in both our countries. Yet court decisions in
Pakistan as well as the United States must show, by our
constitutional direction, religious tolerance. This understanding
assists the judiciary in promoting a culture of tolerance.
II.
Although the judicial branches of our countries may take the
first step in elucidating and implementing constitutional directives
through the issuance of orders, realization of the constitutional
guarantees are often hindered by cultural or political resistance to
those orders. As a result, successful implementation of court orders
often relies on assistance from the executive or legislative branch of
government. For example, in order to rectify the found constitutional
6. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at paras. 2–8.
7. PAK. PENAL CODE 295-A.
8. See, e.g., Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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violation, the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s June 2014 order called
for an Executive Task Force to develop a strategy of religious
tolerance to meet the requirement of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution.9
The task force was to work to ensure that actions are taken to
enforce minority rights and to educate law enforcement, judges,
and Pakistan’s citizens on the right to liberty of conscience secured
in its Constitution. The Supreme Court of Pakistan described what
will be necessary to protect these rights and ensure compliance
with its order. The court specifically mentioned, but did not limit
its analysis to, the need for revised curricula in schools,
discouragement of hate speech on social media, a National Council
for minorities’ rights to monitor progress of the practical realization
of these rights and safeguards, a Special Police Force to protect
places of worship, and appropriate law enforcement to ensure the
court’s judgment is carried into effect.10
The court’s opinion seems to indicate that now is a critical time
for Pakistan to engage its government and citizens in a galvanized
movement to recognize the fundamental rights of religious minorities
guaranteed by its own Constitution. I suggest that the declaration
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan marks a watershed moment in
the country’s history and development as a powerful nation in a
globalized world of interdependence. But effective movement
toward national religious tolerance, a value essential to Pakistan’s
founders, will require government leadership. The required
executive supervisory task force can implement the court’s
direction in a comprehensive and evenhanded manner for all of
Pakistan’s people.
Change will not happen overnight as a result of one court order,
but the Pakistan Supreme Court’s recent decision, if supported and
guided by the required Executive Task Force, will likely provide
the necessary catalyst to accomplish lasting reform. An Executive
Task Force would oversee efforts in all sectors—education, media,
law enforcement, places of worship—and would monitor the
progress of those efforts throughout the country.11 Although
implementing an edict of the judicial branch is often a difficult task

9. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 37.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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in any diverse nation, it has been done successfully when supported
by the will of the people and the rule of law.
The Pakistan Supreme Court’s order cites a case decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1954, Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka.12 That case called upon the government to protect minority
rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In this
instance, the Court interpreted the Constitution’s right to equal
protection under the law to require racially integrated public school
systems. Implementation of that judicial decree, however, required
the support of the United States Congress, the President, and
federal law enforcement agencies to ensure that the Court’s ruling
would have full force and effect in those geographical areas where
the ruling contradicted centuries-long cultural mores, which
viewed racial segregation as the natural order.
Although Brown concerned constitutional protection for racial
minorities, its principles are analogous to other social minorities—
even religious minorities. The Pakistan Supreme Court recognized
this in its reliance on Brown.13 Indeed, Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution,
together with its amendments, was ratified by Pakistan’s Parliament
and became the supreme law of the land. Pakistan’s Constitution
grants equal protection of the rights of conscience to all citizens of
all religious persuasions.14 The Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014
order recites these constitutional protections and calls for the
federal government to act to enforce the rights to freedom of
individual and community religious tolerance and freedoms.15 As
the United States’ Brown v. Board of Education decision demonstrates, a supreme court may decree, but the rest of the country’s
government must carry out the court’s judgment to make a lasting
impact. Thus, the United States’ experience under Brown has some
relevance to Pakistan’s upcoming experience with the religious
tolerance opinion.
B.
The civil rights movement in the United States was highlighted
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, but
12.
13.
14.
15.

74

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 30.
PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 20, 25.
S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at paras. 10–12.

004.WALLACE_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

69

9/25/20 11:53 AM

With an Even Hand

did not end there. That case concerned equal education rights for
school children, but the judgment taught a principle of equal
treatment for minorities beyond the scope of America’s schools.
The thrust of the Court’s decision called attention to the need for a
fundamental change in the socioeconomic structure and political
atmosphere of American society that could ensure equal rights for
all races. It was a turning point, especially for certain geographical
regions, where communities had long-standing practices of racial
segregation and separate, unequal public facilities for different races.
Those communities were resistant to change. To implement the
Supreme Court’s directive, more than a court order was needed.
The support of the United States’ President and Congress, the
sword and purse of the country,16 were needed to oversee those
changes not only to integrate racial minorities into historically
white schools, but also to begin the process to ensure that racial
minorities were afforded equal opportunity in other public
accommodations as well. In other words, the executive and
legislative branches of national government, armed with a
comprehensive strategy, were needed to ensure full acceptance of
the court’s guarantee.
Although many communities and schools followed the Court’s
directive peacefully, others resisted. This resistance, in some cases,
was violent, despite the Supreme Court’s directive. As a result, the
Court’s order was not immediately enforceable in many
communities, and others were hesitant to proceed. After one year
of confusion and inaction, the Court issued a second opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education to deliver a more directive strategy to
implement its edict.17
The impact of Brown v. Board of Education was not limited to
racial integration in public schools. The Court’s order struck at the
heart of longstanding cultural discrimination that impinged upon
constitutional guarantees. This could not be resolved overnight. It
took time, work, and the influence of the executive and legislative
leadership to ensure that protection for minorities would endure.
The effort continues today.

16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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C.
Perhaps the example of the United States’ progress in this area
can inform the movement for religious tolerance that is beginning
in Pakistan. Even when presented with legal authority, acceptance
of change at the individual and community levels requires a
comprehensive strategy and the full backing of a nation’s government to implement it. Based on the United States’ experience, a
Pakistan Executive Task Force will play a key role in implementing
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious conscience and
observance in Pakistan following the June 2014 Pakistan Supreme
Court decision.
As was the case after Brown, Pakistan will confront some
difficulties in implementing the June 2014 order. For many
communities, it will affect a cultural paradigm shift that likely will
struggle for acceptance even with the support of an Executive Task
Force to support and monitor progress toward religious tolerance.
Pakistan has a law that prohibits blasphemy against any religion.
Historically, the law has not been enforced to protect the views or
practices of religious minorities. Following an attack on a Christian
church, as discussed in the court’s June 2014 order, police conceded
that it believed the law did not protect from attack or desecration
places of worship for religious minorities.18 A common view was
that the blasphemy law only applies to attacks on Islam.19 Even
though the law was made clear by the Supreme Court of Pakistan,
the prevailing misunderstanding will take time to correct. It is
difficult to reconcile a common view that attacks on religious
minorities are not blasphemous, although they were indeed unlawful
under the Pakistan Penal Code, with constitutional provisions that
require liberty of religious belief for all citizens.
Like the United States, Pakistan was founded on values that
embraced religious diversity. At the time of Pakistan’s founding,
the Muslim faith was a minority in India, so protections for liberty
of belief and worship for all religious minorities took center stage
in the framing of Pakistan’s Constitution. Although today Islam is
the primary religion in Pakistan, where it enjoys a special status
both in practice and politics, it should not be overlooked that
Pakistan became an independent nation following a movement to
18. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 8.
19. Id. at paras. 8–9.
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protect a religious minority—the Muslim minority in northern India
in the early twentieth century. Pakistan’s founders intended to form
a country that would be tolerant of all religious beliefs. Pakistan is
an Islamic nation that can strive for religious tolerance. Such a
course will strengthen Pakistan’s government, its citizens, and its
place in a globalized world that so often struggles to accommodate
religious diversity. It is clear from the court’s June 2014 order that
government and law enforcement agencies are not fully informed
of the Constitution’s protections for religious minorities, or they are
unable to enforce them in some cases due to societal pressures.
Education and training will be a critical aspect of the Executive
Task Force’s strategy for religious tolerance. Training is necessary
for local leaders and law enforcement agencies, particularly in
regard to desecrators of places of worship and unlawful attacks on
minorities that have long gone without penalty because government officials believed it to be legally permissible. Education is
critical not only for those in leadership, but in Pakistan’s schools
where an unbiased curriculum will be a great step forward for the
country’s future.
A central Executive Task Force can bring local organizations
together to address issues of religious freedom that are uniform—
or varied—across the country. The court’s order provides
additional direction that will allow Pakistan to take a step forward,
and the efforts toward these goals are essential for religious
tolerance. A National Council for Minority Rights will monitor
progress, and a special police force will protect places of worship
of religious minorities.20
III.
It is a critical time for Pakistan to show its respect and support
for its apex court and the Constitution it follows. Pakistan can be a
leader in a region of the world that has had religious diversity for
thousands of years, yet tolerance for religious minorities has
weakened and led to ongoing struggles for independence and
peace. If a country’s people are continually exposed to judicial
outcomes without force due to political or financial pressures, lack
of tolerance, or other illegitimate influences, they will not expect to
be treated fairly when bringing their complaints to the judicial
20. Id. at para. 37.
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system. Corruption in, and distrust of, the legal system will breed
more of the same. When the public perceives that either the government or those individuals or groups who are favored by the
government are receiving special treatment from the judiciary, the
government and judiciary lose authority. Particularly in a republic,
the government is legitimated by the support of its people. A
judiciary that does not independently review the actions of the
other branches detracts from the people’s belief in their government’s
legitimacy. As United States constitutional supporter Alexander
Hamilton stated, “where the will of the legislature, declared in its
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather
than the former.”21 The strictures placed on the government by the
Constitution are meaningless if the branch that is to determine
whether actions are within those limits is not supported and
followed by its political leadership.
In countries seeking to develop or strengthen an independent
judiciary, the public must be made aware of both the move toward
and need for judicial independence. In order to raise public
awareness, occurrences of the judiciary fairly meting out justice
with tolerance to all who come before it should be publicized. In
order to demonstrate that the country’s laws apply fairly and
equally to all, the public should be informed when bringing to
account the government officials who are corrupt or otherwise
violate the law. Focusing on making the judiciary more independent assists in creating a culture of tolerance and promotes
religious tolerance.
Thus, the action of the executive and legislative powers in
Pakistan in response to the Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014
order is vital not only for the issue of the case, but also for showing
the support for and response to the constitutionally based direction.
Citizens’ desire for religious tolerance will be heightened if
citizens can expect timely justice when the judicial process is used
to resolve conflicts. Pakistan can deliver justice by carrying out the
Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014 order to ensure that protections
for religious minorities, both in religious belief and worship and in
representation, are observed and enforced. As clearly stated in the
1973 Pakistan Constitution, “the right to religious conscience is
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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a right equally granted to all citizens, religious denominations
and sects.”22
IV.
But what is the benefit to the majority of Pakistan’s citizens if
the government follows the Pakistan Supreme Court’s directions
and minority religious rights are protected? One such benefit is the
promotion of democratic values.
There are many ways in which the free exercise of religion can
invigorate and reinforce democratic government. We may glean
some insights on how to realize these benefits by examining briefly
the views of the Founders of the United States Constitution. I will
then turn to some of the challenges we all face in ensuring that
diverse individuals can choose, embrace, or altogether reject
different religions. I propose a simple metaphor—the public square.
As I see it, religious freedom and democracy go hand in hand;
each strengthens and reinforces the other in several ways. First,
many believe the free exercise of religion can promote a more
humanitarian, tolerant society. For example, most religions teach
the importance of a power greater than one’s self. The very nature
of this belief puts an adherent in a position where he or she believes
that the beginning and end of all creation, and the importance of
life, transcend individual needs and wants.23 As one comes to
understand that others are equally subordinated, there is a greater
likelihood of involvement with other members of society. One can
become more attuned to the horizontal equality that knits a
community together, as well as the vertical belief in a higher power
which instills a sense of humility. This “turning out” phenomenon
increases the possibility of genuine concern for others and is
important to a society which cares for those in need.24
22. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014, at para. 11.
23. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values:
Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1588 (1987)
(“The religious link between the mundane here and now of physical existence and the
possibility of a transcendent, enduring reality beyond, instills in many religious people the
desire and duty to improve their own lot and that of their fellows by suggesting the moral
possibilities of a better way of living, and by cultivating respect for the law, including a
greater willingness to restrict one’s own choices and actions to benefit others. Thus, religious
consciousness is an important positive influence on the substance of societal values.”).
24. In addition to the individual “turning out” effect, religious institutions also provide
various humanitarian services. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970)
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Second, most religions—but not all—promote civic virtue and
influence believers to be law abiding.25 Democratic societies
generally function because the vast majority of people are willing
to obey the law without enforcement action by the state.26 Even if
possible, it does not make sense to allocate limited government
resources to a police force capable of enforcing all laws in a nonlaw abiding society. Allowing, without impediment, people to
exercise religious beliefs which tend to encourage acceptance of
legal norms can therefore further a law-abiding culture, which is
essential to democracy.27
Third, religious freedom preserves an important opportunity
for choice, which is a key component of liberty. When each religious
community is free to proclaim its tenets and teach others, there will
be a wider landscape of varying religious views and a broader
spectrum of choices. As a result, each individual has a greater
opportunity to make a choice that best fits his or her personal needs.
Religious freedom is therefore both an important end in itself as
well as one of the cornerstones of self-determination, individual
choice, and pluralism.28 There is a profound liberty interest in being
(Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that religious organizations “contribute to the wellbeing of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that
would otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment
of the community”).
25. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) (“[T]his record strongly shows
that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society, even
if apart from the conventional ‘mainstream.’ Its members are productive and very lawabiding members of society . . . .”).
26. President John Adams remarked, “[W]e have no government armed with power
capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion.” DAVID
BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT 319 (3d ed. 2000); see also, Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 23, at
1595 (“Because even a relatively small number of dissenters can render law enforcement
ineffective, an overwhelming majority of persons must be willing voluntarily to restrict their
personal choices and actions to those not prohibited by law if law is to have significant force
and effect.”).
27. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, “[O]nly a virtuous people are capable of
freedom. As nations become corrupt and vicious, they have more need of masters.” BARTON,
supra note 26, at 321.
28. See Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 83, 10–08, for a discussion of personal freedom as a justification for the special
constitutional treatment of religion. See also Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)
at 12–13 (1993), http://www.echr.coe.int (“[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is
one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the Convention [for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]. It is, in its religious dimension,
one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the
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able to choose something as fundamental and personal as religion.29
Thus, with freedom to thrive, religions can help elevate the political
process in society to a higher plane of democracy and individual
freedom.30 It can also lead to a more stable society because freedom
to choose a religion which best fits individual needs will result in a
more satisfied society.31
Finally, just as our collective viewpoint is enriched by ethnic
and racial diversity, so too can diversity in religious cultures
contribute to our political and social discourse.32 It is important to
consider diverse perspectives in dealing with new challenges
facing our society.

unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly
won over the centuries, depends on it.”).
29. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“By its nature, religion—in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitution
uses that word—is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly relates the life
of man to the world in which he lives.”); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 23, at 1602.
30. “Respect for the exercise of conscience and religion is a fundamental aspect of a
universal understanding of human rights.” Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home and
Abroad: Reflections on Protecting This Fundamental Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 413, 413–14.
31. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 211, 230–32 (Ian
Shapiro ed., 2003) (recognizing that the legitimacy and stability of a political regime can be
enhanced by tolerating a range of religious outlooks); cf. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–9 (1970) (positing that in a democratic society, the system of
freedom of expression is based on, inter alia, the principle that freedom of expression is
essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment and is a method of achieving a
more adaptable, stable community).
32. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“[R]eligious organizations . . . uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by
their religious activities. . . [E]ach group contributes to the diversity of association,
viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[M]any of our legal, political and
personal values derive historically from religious teachings.”); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 150 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[U]nity and strength are best accomplished, not by
enforced orthodoxy of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible
measure of freedom of conscience and thought.”); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 336 (1986) (“Today’s constitutional
doctrines of equal citizenship, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression mediate
cultural conflict by opening our public life to the participation of cultural minorities. By
defending against cultural subordination and the coercion of cultural conformity, the same
doctrines also promote tolerance for cultural difference. Together, these guarantees promise
individuals broad freedom to choose for themselves among ‘the varieties of ethnic
experience.’”).
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A.
The challenges facing religious freedom will vary among
countries and regions based on differences in culture, history,
structure of government, and myriad other factors. The experience
of the United States provides one of many possible examples of
these challenges, which I briefly discuss here only for comparative
purposes.
The success of the United States Constitution as an authoritative
document of governance can be observed by the fact that it has now
existed for more than 200 years, the longest life of any written
constitution in the history of the world.33 Perhaps looking at the
views of the Founders of the Constitution can shed light on why
even today U.S. citizens feel religious freedom is so integral to the
social and political fabric of their nation, as well as inform them
about the challenges to religious freedom that have nonetheless
been a part of their nation’s history.
The Founders sought to protect the important societal and individual values of free religion in part by means of the Establishment
Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion.”34 As I have explained elsewhere, the Founders’ primary
concern was to prevent the establishment of a dominant religion,
the power of which would squelch the voice of smaller religions.35
They did not create an impenetrable wall to prevent any relations
between government and religion. Nowhere in the Constitution are
the words “separation of church and state” to be found.36 However,
subsequent misinterpreters of the Constitution and its Founders
have embraced the now-proverbial “separation of church and

33. See, e.g., David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 811 (1986).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition has been enforced against the States by
incorporation of the First Amendment into the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”).
35. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 BYU
L. REV. 755, 769.
36. Id. at 756 & n.16 (“[N]one of the twenty drafts of the religion clauses generated by
the state ratification process and the First Congress contained this or similar phrases.”).
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state,”37 and some advocate a government that is indifferent to the
role of religion in our society.38
It has been argued, and history seems to support the argument,
that the Establishment Clause was not meant to be interpreted as
anti-religious, but only as a prohibition on preferential treatment
for a particular church.39 I believe former Chief Justice of the United
States William Rehnquist has the better of the argument on this
issue when he wrote in his dissent in an Establishment Clause case:
The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke [during the
First Congress’ debates on the First Amendment] were concerned,
appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and
perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it
was definitely not concerned about whether the Government
might aid all religions evenhandedly.40

It is true that in a letter to a small religious group, Thomas
Jefferson, in the later years of his life, did state that the
Establishment Clause erected “a wall of separation between church
and state.”41 But as I have argued elsewhere, there can be no
“legislative history” from this statement as Mr. Jefferson was out of
the country at the time the amendments were debated and
adopted.42 Indeed, his earlier history demonstrates, and his actions
verify, that he did not embrace a governmental position of anti-

37. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The First Amendment has
erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach.”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to
separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the
foundation of our democracy.”).
38. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“When the
government arrogates to itself a role in religious affairs, it abandons its obligation as
guarantor of democracy.”).
39. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 14–15 (2002);
Wallace, supra note 35, at 756. The First Amendment has often been understood to limit
religious freedom in ways never imagined by the late eighteen-century dissenters who
demanded constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. Not least, the dissenters sought the
First Amendment and other constitutional provisions to prevent government from
discriminating on account of religious differences. See Wallace, supra note 35, at 756.
40. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41. HAMBURGER, supra note 39, at 161. See also id. at 155–62 for a discussion of the
historical context of Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.
42. Wallace, supra note 35, at 767–68.
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religion; rather, he merely conditioned government assistance on
equal access by all sects.43
Thus, the Establishment Clause was not meant to be antireligious. It was adopted only to be sure that no national religion
was established and that no preferential treatment would be given
to a particular church. At its inception, there was no “wall of
separation” but rather a principle of encouraging religion without
discrimination. By the First Amendment, Congress was enjoined
from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. With no nationally
recognized religion and a prohibition on governmental interference
with and discrimination against different religious practices,
freedom of religion would have the fertile ground it needs to thrive.
This dilemma is worth highlighting because it illustrates one of
the challenges faced by all societies, namely, the difficulty of
drawing a sensible line between establishing religion and wiping it
out of the public sphere altogether. I suggest the Founders embraced
a position in between these two points: non-discriminatory
encouragement of all religions. Reasonable minds can certainly
differ on precisely where the line should be drawn in particular
cases, and much of the debate about the role of religion vis-à-vis
government boils down to this fundamental question.
B.
With this background, we can turn to assessing how well a
nation has been strengthening and protecting the free exercise of
diverse religious cultures. One measure of a country’s success is
how well it treats all religions and how freely its people are able to
openly practice their beliefs. In this regard, our focus can be more
precise. I propose examination of the extent to which a country has
nurtured free exercise of religion by focusing on whether it has
promoted freedom in the public square.
In earlier days, and to some extent still, communities had a
block of land in the center of the city where open communication
and debate would occur. Hyde Park Corner in London, England, is

43. See id. at 768; cf., HAMBURGER, supra note 39, at 181 (“After writing to the Danbury
Baptist Association in 1802, Jefferson himself apparently did not again directly advocate
separation. He continued to denounce the union of church and state, but he seems not to
have expressly urged separation. For example, when . . . he denounced political preaching
in 1815, he did not do so in terms of the separation of church and state.”).
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a good example.44 If we visited the town squares of the various
Pakistani communities, would we find religions free to advance
their causes openly without fear of government interference? Does
freedom of religion grow and develop in the town square
unmolested by dominant religions?
Perhaps some specific questions might assist our dialogue:
1. Can all churches proffer their religious beliefs?
2. Are all religions treated equally by the state?
3. Can religious groups teach others their beliefs openly
and encourage acceptance?
4. Are there government restrictions on open and free
religious dialogue?
5. Are there restrictions on the distribution of written
materials used to explain one’s religious views, or can
these materials be distributed freely?
6. Are there visa restrictions placed on visitors entering the
country who wish to teach religion?
After identifying restrictions on religion, we should ask whether
they are arguably justified and weigh the importance of free exercise
against other societal goals. For example:
1. Does a religion adopt terrorism as a tenet or practice of
its sect, or does it advocate violation of generally
accepted criminal laws?
2. Does a religion teach concepts that are in violation of
basic human rights?
3. Is a restriction on religion necessary to ensure that
others can freely exercise their religious beliefs or is it
aimed at silencing unwanted religious views?
Clearly, a sensible approach to promoting religious freedom
must be principled, pragmatic, and flexible, but with a keen eye
toward ferreting out pretextual restrictions which are designed to
suppress unpopular religious beliefs. In this respect, specific “town
square” questions may help us focus on particular restrictions on
44. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 488 (2003) (“The ideal of the public forum suggests a place where citizens
can congregate, air their grievances, debate public policy, and be confronted with new
thoughts and arguments. Archetypal public forums include the Athenian Senate and Hyde
Park’s Speaker’s Corner, and the myth of their influence and importance is hard to dispel.”).
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religion, and then critically evaluate these restrictions in order to
determine whether they are justifiable.45 Furthermore, by focusing
on specific facets of free exercise in the public square, we can
develop a general sense of where a nation has drawn the line
between establishing a national religion, tolerating all religions
equally, and, at the other end of the spectrum, wiping all religion
out of the public square.
C.
Applying this “public square” inquiry, we can now turn to
identifying and evaluating some of the obstacles to free exercise. By
way of example, I call to your attention two specific challenges—
the view that religious pluralism must be suppressed in order to
promote a more stable society, and the stifling influence of a
dominant religion. Two cases decided by the European Court of
Human Rights are illustrative, and I discuss each in turn.
1.
First, in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the European Court of Human Rights considered whether the Moldovan
authorities’ refusal to recognize the Metropolitan Church of
Bessarabia unlawfully infringed on freedom of religion and association, in violation of Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection
45. Compare, for example, the analysis of the European Court of Human Rights in
Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999). In that case, Serif claimed his
conviction for “usurping the functions of a minister of a ‘known religion’ and publicly
wearing the dress of such a minister amounted to a violation of his rights” under Article 9 of
the Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, id. at 1; which
provides that
[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, Eur.
T.S.
The court reasoned that while
[i]t is true that in a democratic society it may be necessary to place restrictions on
freedom of religion to reconcile the interests of the various religious groups . . .
any such restriction must correspond to a ‘pressing social need’ and must be
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’
Serif, App. No. 38178/97 at 11. After weighing the competing interests at stake in the case,
the court concluded that Serif’s Article 9 rights had been violated. Id. at 12.
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention). 46
Pursuant to Moldova’s Religious Denominations Act, only
religions recognized by the government could be practiced.47
The government contended, among other things, that because
the Republic of Moldova had only been recognized as an independent state since 1991, it “had few strengths it could depend on to
ensure its continued existence, but one factor conducive to stability
was religion, the majority of the population being Orthodox
Christians.”48 Therefore, the government argued, if the Metropolitan
Church of Bessarabia was officially recognized the “tie was likely
to be lost and the Orthodox Christian population dispersed among
a number of Churches.”49
The court recognized that protection of public order was a
legitimate aim, but it nonetheless held:
[T]he Court considers that the refusal to recognise the applicant
Church has such consequences for the applicants’ freedom of
religion that it cannot be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued or, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society,
and that there has a been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.50

The court also stated that “the role of the authorities . . . is not
to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to
ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other.”51
Thus, one challenge facing religious freedom is the belief that
religious pluralism will lead to societal instability. Proponents of
this view contend that if there are fewer choices—or perhaps only
one choice—there will be fewer or no differences in religious views,
thus resulting in a more stable society.52 But put in context, such
46. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002).
47. Id. at 24. In addition to being unable to practice their religion, unrecognized
churches could not defend their rights in the courts. As a result, members of the Metropolitan
Church of Bessarabia were unable to defend themselves against physical attacks and
persecution, and the Church could not protect its assets. Id. at 29–30.
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id. at 27.
52. See also, Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) (the government
contended that “the authorities had to intervene in order to avoid the creation of tension
among the Muslims in Rodopi and between the Moslems and the Christians of the area as
well as Greece and Turkey”); Buscarini v. San Marino, 6 B.H.R.C. 638, 9 (1999) (members of
Parliament required to take an oath on the Holy Gospels, and government attempted to
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instability is an unavoidable aspect of democracy. Democratic elections cause instability, and even when a political leader is
democratically elected, various voices strongly advocate their
positions, and there are ordinarily adherents in more than one camp.
This instability and pluralism is a basic value within a democratic
society;53 it is the liberty interest of choice which is the basis of
democracy.54 Accordingly, it is important to ask why religious
differences should be singled out for discrimination.55 With so
much natural and expected instability in a democratic society, how
can special restrictions on religion be justified?
2.
Yet another obstacle to religious freedom was at issue in
Kokkinakis v. Greece.56 Article 13 of the Constitution of Greece
provides: “There shall be freedom to practise [sic] any known
religion; individuals shall be free to perform their rites of worship
without hindrance and under the protection of the law. The
performance of rites of worship must not prejudice public order or
public morals. Proselytism is prohibited.”57

justify this requirement by arguing the oath was needed to “preserve public order, in the
form of social cohesion and the citizens’ trust in their traditional institutions”).
53. As one commentator has remarked, rather than assuming that instability is
undesirable, “[w]e should instead be fostering dissent, and we should be recognizing that
religious dissent has much to contribute to the creation of a more progressive society.”
Steven Shiffrin, Propter Honoris Respectum: Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1631, 1634 (1999). See also, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In a free government
the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one
case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree
of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects.”); LOCKE, supra
note 31, at 40–41 (“It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the
refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted),
that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon
account of religion.”).
54. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the
Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (“[T]he same respect for human autonomy that
underlies liberty underlies democracy as well and establishes its intrinsic value.”).
55. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 28, at 97 (suggesting many of the most divisive social
issues have not involved religion, such as “the completion of industrial unionization in the
late 1930s; McCarthyism in the early 1950s; the campaign for racial equality from the middle
1950s onward; prolongation of the Vietnam War; and perhaps the Watergate scandal”).
56. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
57. Id. at 6.
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Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights observed
that the ban on proselyting was originally enacted after the
Orthodox Church, “which had long complained of a Bible society’s
propaganda directed at young Orthodox schoolchildren on behalf
of the Evangelical Church, managed to get a clause added to the
first Constitution (1844) forbidding ‘proselytism and any other
action against the dominant religion.’”58 This ban was eventually
codified as a criminal offense.59
Kokkinakis was a Jehovah’s Witness who visited the home of a
woman whose husband was a cantor at a local Orthodox church,
and Kokkinakis engaged in a discussion with her about religion. He
was convicted of proselytism after a criminal court determined that
Kokkinakis
attempted to proselytize and, directly or indirectly, to intrude on
the religious beliefs of Orthodox Christians, with the intention of
undermining those beliefs, by taking advantage of their
inexperience, their low intellect, and their naïvety. In particular,
[he] went to the home of [Mrs Kyriakaki] . . . and told her that they
brought good news; by insisting in a pressing manner, they
gained admittance to the house and began to read from a book on
the Scriptures which they interpreted with reference to a king of
heaven, to events which had not yet occurred but would occur,
etc., encouraging her by means of their judicious, skilful [sic]
explanations . . . to change her Orthodox Christian beliefs.60

In considering whether Kokkinakis’ conviction violated Article
9 of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights
distinguished between “bearing Christian witness and improper
proselytism.”61 Whereas “[t]he former corresponds to true
evangelism, which a report . . . describes as an essential mission and
a responsibility of every Christian and every Church,” improper
proselytism entails, for example, “exerting improper pressure on
people in distress or in need,” “offering material or social
advantages” to gain new members, or even “the use of violence or
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 3–4 (omissions in original). The criminal court sentenced Kokkinakis to four
months’ imprisonment, which was convertible into a pecuniary penalty, as well as a fine of
10,000 drachmas. The court also ordered the confiscation and destruction of four booklets
that Kokkinakis had been hoping to sell. Id.
61. Id. at 16.

89

004.WALLACE_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/25/20 11:53 AM

2020

brainwashing.”62 The court concluded that the Greek courts had
failed to specify how Kokkinakis’ proselytizing was improper, and,
therefore, his conviction violated Article 9.63
This case illustrates how governments may be influenced by a
dominant church to impose restrictions on minority religions.64 The
motivation of the dominant church is not benign: it wishes to
eliminate competition. When a church achieves monopoly power,
it is in a position to restrict and, in some cases, eliminate less
powerful religious organizations.
Similar problems of monopoly arise in the context of capitalism
and market control. While it is true that economic monopolies can
provide certain services and have some advantages, experience has
demonstrated that the free enterprise system is far more valuable
in providing the best climate for economic growth, consumer
satisfaction, and individual prosperity. There are examples of
countries that have made the dynamic swing from central
organization (government monopoly) to the free enterprise system,
with resulting benefits and economic progression for its citizens.
Likewise, when a religious monopoly has the strength to
squelch other religious views, it diminishes or eliminates the
growth opportunities for religions generally. Just as some
regulation is necessary to ensure the smooth operation of markets,
so it may be necessary for the government to enforce a few ground
rules in order to keep the public square in good repair and the
marketplace of ideas vibrant. However, when a dominant religion
monopolizes the public square, the opportunity for individual
choice, the cross-fertilization of ideas, and other benefits of a
religiously diverse democracy are jeopardized. Thus, just as
economic monopolies can ultimately undermine capitalism, so too
can religious monopolies weaken democracy.
The influence of a dominant religion and government concerns
about stability are but two of the many obstacles to religious
freedom today. Other examples include:
62. Id. at 16–17.
63. Id. at 17.
64. See also, id. at 6 (Article 3 of the Constitution of Greece provides that “[t]he
dominant religion in Greece is that of the Christian Eastern Orthodox Church”);
Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997) (The Greek Orthodox
Church made a complaint about the use of a room by Jehovah’s Witnesses and a prosecution
was instituted for establishing and operating a place of religious worship without
authorization from the proper authorities).
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1. Government refusal to recognize religions;
2. Restrictions on the availability of visas for religious
missionaries;
3. Unnecessary restrictions on building houses of worship;
4. Governmental designation of a religion as a “sect” and
imposing special restrictions on “sects”; and
5. Discrimination against religions with headquarters in a
different country.
D.
How does a member of a dominant religion or a non-believer in
any faith also benefit if religious pluralism and protection of
minority religions are established? As my prior analysis demonstrates, everyone gains from religious pluralism and protection of
minority religions. The process is one that supports and energizes
democracy, encourages free choice in all areas of society, and
provides a framework for improvement of society. All citizens will
benefit from this process.
What better legacy could be left to future generations of
Pakistanis than a truly free and open society, with no restrictions
on choice so long as no laws are broken? These would be the
building blocks to a society where all will have real choice and
democratic pluralism.
All will benefit.
V.
But is there evidence that protecting religious minorities’ rights
will have a real effect on improving the lives of all citizens of
Pakistan? A recent study by American scholars concludes that
religious freedom has a positive impact on the strength of a nation’s
economy.65 The study’s findings are supported by an analysis of
data related to global economic competitiveness from the World
Economic Forum, as compared with country data from the Pew
Foundation on government restriction of religion and social
hostilities related to religion.66

65. Brian J. Grim, Greg Clark, & Robert Edward Snyder, Is Religious Freedom Good for
Business?: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis, 10 INTERDISC. J. OF RES. ON RELIGION 1 (2014).
66. See generally id.
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The data comes from twelve fields, or “pillars,” that are
indicators of economic strength and utilized to measure global
competitiveness. The pillars include success markers such as
primary education and health, higher education, technological
innovation, market efficiency and size, and business sophistication.67
In this particular study, scholars compared these measures of
economic competitiveness with data on governments’ restrictions
of religion. The comparison revealed that countries with a low level
of government restriction on religion had stronger indicators of
global economic competitiveness in almost all of the pillars used to
measure global competitiveness.68 For example, the pillar of “primary
education and health” was ranked strongly for 16 percent of
countries that had low (as compared to moderate or high) government restrictions on religion, while no country with high government
restrictions received a strong score in that pillar for global
competitiveness.69 The same connection was found with technical
training, higher education, and technological readiness.70 Overall,
the percentage of countries with low religious hostilities or government restriction on religion surpassed high-level religious suspension
countries in almost every pillar of competitiveness.71
In addition to the pillars of global competitiveness mentioned
above, the research includes a study on the relationship between
government restrictions on religion and economic growth, as
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) growth per country.72
In this study, the researchers prepared a statistical model to
demonstrate the effects of various socio-economic factors on GDP
growth. The model included factors such as population, monetary
and business freedom, tax rates and burdens, inflation, and foreign
direct investment, as well as religious restrictions. On a model
using twenty-five of these factors, it was discovered that only five
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. Measured against the pillars of macroeconomic growth and market size, the
percentage of countries with high hostilities and government restrictions surpassed those
countries with “low” hostilities and restrictions. The researchers conclude that this is due to
a recent economic downturn in large Western countries, and the large market sizes in China,
with a high level of government restriction of religion, and India, with high social hostilities.
Id. at 11–12.
72. Id. at 11–14.
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of the factors were significant as either positive or negative
predictors of a country’s GDP growth.73 The most positive significant
factor was previous five-year GDP growth.74 Monetary freedom and
religious restrictions were the most significant negative predictors
of GDP growth in 2011, the latest year of data available to the study.
Thus, restriction on religion in a country was a better predictor of
economic growth, or lack of growth, than were typical economic
factors such as foreign investment, tax rates, and inflation.
There is a great capacity for additional research in light of the
clear statistical correlation between religious freedom and a
country’s economic strength, and yet, standing alone, the numbers
already reveal that bolstering religious rights and freedoms will not
have a negative impact on global economic competitiveness or
success, and may even have a positive effect on growth.
VI.
This brings me back to the Pakistan Supreme Court’s June 2014
opinion authored by Chief Justice Jillani. He persuasively shows
how religious minorities are protected by the constitution. So far,
so good. But, similar to what was faced by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Brown, there is a gap between announcement
of the constitutional right and the reality of its application due to
changes required in the actions of government, law enforcement
agencies, and traditional feelings of many of the citizens. As in
Brown, change of rights from parchment to reality requires
government action.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, among other things,
ordered that “the Federal Government should constitute a taskforce
tasked with developing a strategy of religious tolerance,”75 and that
curricula in schools and colleges should “promote a culture of
religious and social tolerance”76 and discourage “hate speeches in
social media.” 77 The court also ordered “a National Council
for [M]inorities’ [R]ights” to monitor the practical realization of
the rights and safeguards “provided to the minorities” and “to
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id.
75. (2014) S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 (SC) para. 37(i) (Pak.), https://www.supremecourt.
gov.pk/downloads_judgements/smc_1_2014.pdf
76. Id. at para. 37(ii).
77. Id. at para. 37(iii).
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frame policy recommendations for . . . the Provincial and Federal
Government.”78 Finally, it ordered the creation of a “Special Police
Force” to protect places of worship.79
The court has done its job: it has found a constitutional violation.
The court has outlined, as best it can at this time, the steps which
must be taken by provincial and federal governments to overcome
the constitutional violations.
As with the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown, the Pakistan
Supreme Court can do no more.
Under a traditional constitutional democracy, it is now up to
the executive and legislative branches to comply.
VII.
It is vital for societies and individuals to value free exercise of
religion in our continuing effort to provide the best in the
democratic institution. It is a topic that deserves our individual and
joint attention. The June 2014 order from the Pakistan Supreme
Court signals a pivotal moment in which the fundamental rights of
religious worship and conscience may achieve their full expression
in the country. As the Pakistan Supreme Court expressed, an
Executive Task Force is likely needed to guide this effort through
the cultural paradigm shift and education that will be crucial to
lasting change. Pakistan’s efforts at this critical time will allow it to
be a leader in a region that desperately needs an example of how
religious pluralism can benefit society as a whole.

78. Id. at para. 37(iv).
79. Id. at para. 37(v).
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